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ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE FEDERAL
ARBITRATION ACT AND RESOLVING DISPUTES IN
ARBITRATION VERSUS A COURT PROCEEDING
INTRODUCTION
Almost everyone enters into an agreement to arbitrate, whether
aware of it or not. Arbitration clauses are now the standard method for
resolving disputes in many consumer contracts, such as insurance, medi-
cal, and broker contracts. Standard arbitration agreements pose the quin-
tessential question: when a dispute arises, and a person's competency to
enter into the contract as a whole is challenged, is the arbitration agree-
ment embedded within the contract enforceable?
With the passage of the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA" or "Act")
in 1925,1 along with the federal government's power and authority to
enforce the FAA, comes an emergent issue of determining when arbitra-
tion, rather than a court proceeding, must be used to resolve a dispute.2
Due to arbitration provisions becoming more common in consumer con-
tracts, many contract disputes, and accordingly many court opinions, will
be based on the enforceability of arbitration agreements in years to
come. 3 In fact, conflicting court decisions resolving arbitration agree-
ments have been abundant since the enactment of the Act, and courts are
still trying to reach a consistent pattern of uniformity to enforce arbitra-
tion provisions.4
The FAA establishes in Title 9 of the United States Code, Section 2,
that "[a] written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evi-
dencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a con-
troversy thereafter arising .. .shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforce-
1 United States Arbitration Act, ch. 213, § 1, 43 Stat. 883, 883-86 (1925) (currently codified
at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2000)). Congress later renamed the United States Arbitration Act the Federal
Arbitration Act and enacted it into law on July 30, 1947, ch. 392, § 1, 61 Stat. 674.
2. See Steven Shavell, Alternative Dispute Resolution: An Economic Analysis, 24 J. LEGAL
STUD. 1, 1-3 (1995) (discussing the widespread use of alternative dispute resolution ("ADR") in
resolving contract disputes and problems that arise); see also Spahr v. Secco, 330 F.3d 1266, 1273
(10th Cir. 2003) (holding the plaintiffs mental incapacity invalidated the entire contract as well as
the embedded arbitration clause); Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg., 388 U.S. 395, 406-07
(1967) (holding that a claim of fraud in the inducement of the entire contract is a matter for arbitra-
tion, and not the court, when the contract contains a valid arbitration clause).
3. See Maureen A. Weston, Checks on Participant Conduct in Compulsory ADR: Reconcil-
ing the Tension in the Need for Good-Faith Participation, Autonomy, and Confidentiality, 76 IND.
L.J. 591, 593-97 (2001) (discussing the widespread use of arbitration clauses in consumer and em-
ployment contracts and the potential for misconduct and abuse in the ADR process because of the
participants' lack of good faith and the absence of judicial oversight or regulation).
4. David P. Pierce, The Federal Arbitration Act: Conflicting Interpretations of Its Scope, 61
U. CIN. L. REV. 623, 623-24 (1992) (discussing conflicting interpretations of the FAA in various
state decisions).
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able, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revoca-
tion of any contract. '" 5 Additionally, Section 4 states that if a contract
with an arbitration provision has been entered into, and the "making" of
the arbitration agreement is not at issue, the court shall order the parties
to proceed to arbitration.6 Thus, many issues arise when an arbitration
provision is placed in a contract because the agreement to arbitrate is
made "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable," by federal statute, which can
only become unenforceable under the same theories as a contract may
become unenforceable under contract law.7 Since the adoption of the
FAA, arbitration agreements are increasingly used in resolving disputes
that arise out of the contract as a whole, which undoubtedly favors busi-
nesses over consumers.
8
This survey paper9 explores the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
opinion in Spahr v. Secco,10 where the court decided that a mental capac-
ity claim challenging the validity of a contract containing an arbitration
agreement should be resolved in a court proceeding instead of arbitra-
tion." Prior to Spahr, the Tenth Circuit had not addressed this 
issue.1
Other circuits, however, have decided cases similar to Spahr.t3 Although
the outcome in Spahr is different from the outcome other circuits reached
in similar cases,1 4 the holding in Spahr is likely to have important impli-
cations on future court decisions because Spahr readily provides a logi-
cal, fair, and rational method of evaluating the enforceability of arbitra-
tion agreements.
If Spahr is appealed to the United States Supreme Court, however,
the Tenth Circuit's holding in Spahr may be reversed because the Su-
preme Court will likely want to maintain uniformity in court decisions




8. Edward A. Dauer, Judicial Policing of Consumer Arbitration, I PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J.
91, 94-96 (2000) (discussing the widespread use of ADR and the asymmetries of arbitration that
favors businesses over consumers).
9. The survey period runs from September 1, 2002, to August 31, 2003.
10. 330 F.3d 1266 (10th Cir. 2003).
11. Spahr, 330 F.3d at 1273.
12. Id. at 1267-68.
13. See Primerica Life Ins. v. Brown, 304 F.3d 469, 472 (5th Cir. 2002) (finding that a mental
capacity claim challenging a contract containing an arbitration clause should be decided in arbitra-
tion); Jeske v. Brooks, 875 F.2d 71, 75 (4th Cir. 1989) (concluding that claims of unconscionability
and lack of consideration challenging a contract containing an arbitration clause should be decided in
arbitration); Unionmutual Stock Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Beneficial Life Ins., 774 F.2d 524, 529 (lst
Cir. 1985) (concluding that claims of mutual mistake and frustration of purpose challenging a con-
tract containing an arbitration clause should be decided in arbitration).
14. See Spahr, 330 F.3d at 1272-73.
15. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 11-13 (1984); Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp.
v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983). States are also overturning decisions to uphold the
Prima Paint rationale and maintain consistent holdings. See, e.g., Primerica Life Ins., 304 F.3d at
472 (concluding that a challenge to a contract containing an arbitration clause should be decided in
arbitration in accordance with the Prima Paint rationale).
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sufficient public policy reasons to support Spahr,16 the Court may alter
their Prima Paint decision and create a new standard for arbitration
agreements that combine the Prima Paint and Spahr rationales. Should
this occur, arbitration will undergo a change for the better because the
decision in Spahr adds a logical and fair method of interpreting the FAA
that gives arbitration agreements their intended effect.17 Thus, combining
the Prima Paint and Spahr rationale will provide an enhanced method of
evaluating arbitration agreements that is both rational and maintains the
national legislative goals of favoring arbitration.
Part I of this survey examines the background of the FAA by look-
ing at its history and formation, as well as relevant FAA provisions. Part
II of this survey analyzes the Tenth Circuit's recent decision in Spahr v.
U.S. Bancorp Investments, Inc., where the Tenth Circuit held the arbitra-
tion provision unenforceable. Part I of this survey examines other re-
cent circuit court rulings in similar arbitration cases. Finally, this paper
takes the position that Spahr properly held a mental capacity challenge to
a contract containing an arbitration agreement goes to the "making" of




A. History and Formation of the FAA
With the number of cases being litigated on the rise, Congress
passed the FAA in 1925 to make arbitration an equitable alternative to
litigation that would reduce the number of cases in the court system.19 As
a result of increasing national hostility towards arbitration and courts'
refusal to enforce arbitration agreements in contracts, Congress codified
the FAA in Title 9 of the United States Code in 1947 to underscore the
fact that federal policy favors arbitration agreements. 20 This codification
aimed to place arbitration provisions "'upon the same footing as other
16. See Weston, supra note 3, at 593-97; Dauer, supra note 8, at 95-96. Arguably public
policy warrants changing the current rationale regarding consumer arbitration agreements because
they asymmetrically favor businesses and do not provide a fair outcome for consumers; consumers
are forced into arbitration agreements for which they have not bargained, and are denied their right
to a jury trial.
17. See Larry J. Pittman, The Federal Arbitration Act: The Supreme Court's Erroneous Statu-
tory Interpretation, Stare Decisis, and a Proposal for Change, 53 ALA. L. REV. 789, 791-92, 806-
11, 889-90 (2002) (discussing the problems with the Court's current statutory interpretation of the
FAA and how changing to an originalist mode of statutory interpretation would better suit legislative
intent).
18. Spahr, 330 F.3d at 1273.
19. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 13-16 (1984); see also Richard C. Reuben,
Public Justice: Toward a State Action Theory of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 85 CAL. L. REV.
577, 601 (1997) (discussing the history of arbitration in the United States in the early twentieth
century).
20. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24-25 (1991) (quoting Moses H.
Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)).
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contracts'" by allowing courts to invalidate arbitration agreements only
for the same reasons that other contracts could be invalidated.2'
Additionally, Congress intended the FAA to be applicable in federal
courts and state courts, pursuant to the Supremacy Clause.22 In Southland
Corp. v. Keating and Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury
Construction Corp., the Supreme Court took the position that the FAA
trumped state statutes regulating arbitration agreements, thereby invali-
dating conflicting state laws.23 The Supreme Court, however, held that
"state law may be applied 'if that law arose to govern issues concerning
the validity, revocability, and enforceability of contracts generally."
24
The Supreme Court has often reversed state court decisions that
failed to enforce arbitration provisions in the same manner other contract
provisions are enforced. In doing so, the Supreme Court has emphasized
that they favor arbitration, pursuant to the legislative intent behind the
Act.2 5 By allowing state law to govern contracts generally, arbitration
agreements are given the same standing and enforceability as other con-
tracts because arbitration agreements are enforceable on the same
grounds as any other contract.
26
Arbitration is not inferior to litigation, but is simply a different
method of resolving a dispute arising as "'a matter of contract,' 27 in
which a party is not required to arbitrate any dispute to which he has not
agreed.28 The Supreme Court has invalidated decisions where individual
states refused to enforce arbitration provisions to the extent necessary to
give those arbitration provisions the same enforceability as other con-
tracts.
29
The leading decision on the arbitrability of claims is Prima Paint
Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg.30 In Prima Paint, the Supreme Court held
that a claim for fraud in the inducement of the contract, which can in-
validate the entire contract, instead of just the arbitration clause itself,
should be resolved in arbitration. 31 The Court explained that unless there
is concern that the claim involves the "making" of the arbitration provi-
21. Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996) (quoting Scherk v. Alberto-
Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 511 (1974) (citation omitted)).
22. Southland, 465 U.S. at 16.
23. See id.; Moses H. Cone Mem 'l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 24-25.
24. Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 686-87 (quoting Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483,492 n.9 (1987)).
25. See id. at 687-88; Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24-26; Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp., 460 U.S. at
24-25.
26. Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 686-87.
27. AT&T Techs. Inc. v. Communications Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 648 (1986) (quot-
ing United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960)).
28. See Reuben, supra note 19, at 605-07.
29. See Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 687; Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265,
275 (1995).
30. 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
31. Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 406-07.
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sion, Section 4 of the Act mandates the claim should be resolved by arbi-
32tration.
Prima Paint also established the "separability doctrine," which sev-
ers arbitration clauses from the rest of the contract.33 Where a claim does
not attack the arbitration clause itself, but rather the entire contract, that
claim must be resolved through arbitration.34 This holding in Prima Paint
may seem counterintuitive because a claim challenging the entire con-
tract, including the making of the arbitration agreement, is subject to
arbitration while a claim challenging only the arbitration agreement and
not the entire contract may be resolved by the courts. Although it may
seem counterintuitive, Prima Paint established a rational and consistent
pattern to determine which cases must be resolved by arbitration instead
of by a court proceeding. Nonetheless, the Prima Paint rationale has
been questioned because the holding reached by the Court arguably
strayed from the FAA's language and legislative intent.36 In so doing, the
Court extended the FAA beyond cases involving interstate commerce
and made arbitration agreements separable from the rest of the contract.
37
Spahr v. Secco is a case of first impression in the Tenth Circuit 38
and will likely have a significant impact in determining when to mandate
the arbitration of claims because Spahr adds a logical and fair method of
interpreting the Act, even though it departs from Prima Paint. In sum,
arbitration plays an important role in the litigation of consumer contracts.
Moreover, conforming to uniform interpretations of the FAA is of great
importance in future cases because uniformity will provide courts and
consumers guidance in deciding whether to enter into or enforce con-
tracts that contain arbitration agreements.
B. Relevant FAA Provisions
The key statutory provisions in the Act are Title 9 of the United
States Code, Sections 2 through 4. Section 2 of the Act establishes that
an arbitration provision is valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, but con-
tains a "saving clause" allowing for an arbitration provision to be invali-
32. Id. at 403-04.
33. Id. at 402-04.
34. Id. at 403-04; see also Tanya J. Monestier, "Nothing Comes of Nothing" ... Or Does
It??? A Critical Re-Examination of the Doctrine of Separability in American Arbitration, 12 AM.
REV. INT'L ARB. 223, 224-27 (2001) (discussing the consistency with which U.S. case law has
applied the Prima Paint severability doctrine to differentiate between contracts that are void and
contracts that are voidable); Alan Scott Rau, "The Arbitrability Question Itself," 10 AM. REV. INT'L
ARB. 287, 331-36 (1999) (discussing misapplications of the Prima Paint doctrine).
35. Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 403-04; see also Donald E. Johnson, Has Allied-Bruce Terminix
Cos. v. Dobson Exterminated Alabama's Anti-Arbitration Rule?, 47 ALA. L. REV. 577, 609-10
(1996) (noting that although the rule in Prima Paint seems counterintuitive, it comports with the
FAA).
36. Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 407-08 (Black, J., dissenting). For further information on the
legislative history of the FAA see the dissenting opinion.
37. Id. at 409-11 (Black, J., dissenting).
38. Spahr v. Secco, 330 F.3d 1266, 1267-68 (10th Cir. 2003).
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dated under the standard contract defenses,39 such as duress, fraud and
unconscionability.4 ° Section 3 of the FAA establishes that a court shall
stay proceedings where the issue should be resolved in arbitration, !
thereby limiting the court's authority to resolve disputes where the con-
tract contains an arbitration provision.42 Section 4 of the Act dictates
when a court shall resolve a claim rather than requiring arbitration. This
depends on whether the court is satisfied that the "making" of the agree-
43ment is not at issue.
Section 2 of the FAA has been expanded to apply to state substan-
tive and procedural policies in order to comply with the national policy
favoring arbitration. 44 The Supreme Court progressively broadened the
scope of cases to which the FAA extends by including contracts with
arbitration agreements that do not involve interstate commerce.45 The
Supreme Court likewise interpreted Section 4 of the FAA to require that
claims be arbitrated if the making of the arbitration agreement is not at
issue.46
Section 4 of the Act is the key provision in many federal circuit
cases because it allows a court to compel arbitration.4 7 Section 4 of the
FAA gives courts an opportunity to decide whether the claim goes to the
39. See 9 U.S.C. § 2. Section 2 states in relevant part: "A written provision in any maritime
transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a
controversy thereafter arising . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." Id.
40. See Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 687.
41. 9 U.S.C. § 3. Section 3 states:
If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United States upon any is-
sue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such arbitration, the court in
which such suit is pending, upon being satisfied that the issue involved in such suit or
proceeding is referable to arbitration under such an agreement, shall on application of one
of the parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been had in accordance
with the terms of the agreement, providing the applicant for the stay is not in default in
proceeding with such arbitration.
Id.
42. See, e.g., Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 26 (stating that both state and federal
courts are obligated to stay litigation under Section 3).
43. 9 U.S.C. § 4. Section 4 in part states:
A party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to arbitrate under a
written agreement for arbitration may petition any United States district court which, save
for such agreement, would have jurisdiction ... for an order directing that such arbitra-
tion proceed in the manner provided for in such agreement.... The court shall hear the
parties, and upon being satisfied that the making of the agreement for arbitration or the
failure to comply therewith is not in issue, the court shall make an order directing the par-
ties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms of the agreement .... If the
making of the arbitration agreement or the failure, neglect, or refusal to perform the same
be in issue, the court shall proceed summarily to the trial thereof.
Id.
44. Southland, 465 U.S. at 10-16; Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 24; see Prima
Paint, 388 U.S. at 404-05.
45. See Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 401.
46. See id. at 402-04.
47. See Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 403; Spahr, 330 F.3d at 1270; Primerica Life Ins. v. Brown,
304 F.3d 469, 472 (5th Cir. 2002).
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"making" of the arbitration agreement, and if so, that claim may be de-
cided by the court instead of through arbitration. 48 By interpreting Sec-
tion 4 of the FAA in a manner requiring arbitration of almost all claims
brought under a contract containing an arbitration agreement, courts pro-
gressively broadened the scope of cases subject to the FAA. In doing so,
these courts arguably exceeded the legislative intent because arbitration
agreements have been given more influence and effect than other con-
tracts.49
II. UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS DECISIONS
A. The Tenth Circuit
1. Spahr v. Secco
50
In a case of first impression, the Tenth Circuit decided in Spahr
whether parties raising a mental capacity challenge to the validity of an
entire contract should be required to arbitrate according to the contract,
or instead go to a court proceeding. 5' This section of the paper discusses
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in Spahr.
a. Facts
In Spahr v. Secco, Spahr, an elderly man affected by Alzheimer's
and dementia opened an investment account with U.S. Bancorp Invest-
ments, Inc. (U.S. Bancorp), whereby Spahr signed an agreement "prom-
ising to submit any controversy arising out of the account to arbitration
,,52. ... 5lSecco was a female employee working for U.S. Bancorp as
Spahr's broker, investment advisor, and trustee.53 Secco allegedly ex-
ploited Spahr by using sex to finagle him "out of large sums of money
and real estate., 54 When Spahr's estate filed claims against U.S. Bancorp
and Secco to seek recovery, U.S. Bancorp filed a motion to compel arbi-
tration, pursuant to the agreement Spahr signed.55
48. Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 403-04; Spahr, 330 F.3d at 1269-70; Primerica Life Ins. Co.,
304 F.3d at 472.
49. For a detailed examination of the legislative history of the FAA, see IAN R. MACNEIL,
AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW 83-121 (Oxford University Press 1992).
50. 330 F.3d 1266 (10th Cir. 2003).
51. Spahr, 330 F.3d at 1267-68.
52. Id. at 1268. The agreement in this case involves a Cash Account Agreement that stated:
I agree that any controversy arising out of or relating to my account, to transactions with or for me or
to this agreement or the breach thereof, whether executed or to be executed within or outside of the
United States, and whether asserted against broker-dealer and/or its present or former agents or
employees, will be settled by arbitration before and in accordance with the then current rules of the
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The district court denied U.S. Bancorp's motion to compel arbitra-
tion, holding the agreement to arbitrate between Spahr and U.S. Bancorp
was unenforceable because Spahr lacked the requisite mental capacity to
comprehend the nature and effect of the contract.56 U.S. Bancorp and
Secco appealed the district court's decision, claiming Spahr's mental
incompetence challenge to the agreement should never have been heard
by the court and instead should have been resolved in arbitration.57
b. Decision
In Spahr, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district
court's ruling that the agreement is not subject to the arbitration provi-
sion.58 The Tenth Circuit explained that because Spahr lacked the mental
capacity to contract, the claim was not subject to arbitration because the
entire contract was void.59
The Tenth Circuit considered whether parties raising mental capac-
ity claims challenging the validity of an entire contract should be re-
quired to arbitrate pursuant to the contract.60 The court reviewed whether
language in Section 4 of the FAA provides judicial relief to cases where
the entire contract, including the arbitration agreement, is challenged.6'
In cases such as Spahr, where the making of the arbitration agreement is
at issue, the court retains the power to determine whether the arbitration
agreement is valid.62 In reaching this decision, the Tenth Circuit appel-
late court distinguished other circuit decisions from Spahr,63 therein pro-
viding a logical and useful analysis. Spahr reached a different outcome
than other circuits have reached in similar cases because the Tenth Cir-
cuit interpreted Section 4 of the Act as distinguishing between contract
claims that make a contract void, which should be heard by a court, and
contract claims that make the contract voidable, which should be re-
solved in arbitration. 64 Therefore, if a contract claim would risk making
the entire agreement void, including the arbitration agreement, a court
should hear that claim; whereas a contract claim merely making the con-
tract voidable that does not place the "making" of the arbitration agree-
65ment at issue should be resolved in arbitration.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1269.
58. Id. at 1267-68.
59. Id. at 1273.
60. Id. at 1272-73.
61. Id. at1271.
62. Id. at 1269.





c. Analysis of the Tenth Circuit's Holding in Spahr v. Secco
In Spahr, the Court began by applying Title 9 of the United States
Code, Section 4, holding that "[i]t has long been a tenet of federal arbi-
tration law that 'arbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be
required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so
to submit.' ' 66 Thus, when a dispute arises that relates to the contract as a
whole, and includes a broad arbitration agreement, there is not "the req-
uisite clear and unmistakable evidence 'within the four corners of the...
[a]greement that the parties intended to submit the question of whether
an agreement to arbitrate exists to an arbitrator.'
', 67
Additionally, the Tenth Circuit held in Spahr that the Prima Paint
holding did not apply to the facts in Spahr because "[u]nlike a claim of
fraud in the inducement, which can be directed at individual provisions
in a contract, a mental capacity challenge can logically be directed only
at the entire contract" and thus goes to the making of the contract and
should be decided in a court proceeding pursuant to Section 4.68 The
Tenth Circuit then applied Section 4, determining that a mental capacity
claim does go to the making of the contract, and thus should be decided
by a court rather than an arbitrator.69
The Tenth Circuit's decision in Spahr, that the mental capacity chal-
lenge goes to the "making" of the contract and thus should be decided by
a court instead of an arbitrator, is likely to be criticized for departing
from the position of the Supreme Court and other circuits in similar cases
following Prima Paint.70 The determination that a claim goes to the
"making" of the contract and thus may be decided by a court pursuant to
Section 4 will likely be used in rare circumstances because of the court's
strong favor for arbitration, which is shown in court decisions that con-
sistently uphold the FAA.7' The Supreme Court is likely to hold that a
case involving a mental capacity challenge is analogous to a claim of
fraud in the inducement, in that both challenge the validity of the entire
contract without questioning the "making" of the arbitration provision
66. Id. at 1269 (quoting AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Communications Workers of Am. 475 U.S.
643, 648 (1986)).
67. Id. at 1270 (quoting Riley Mfg. v. Anchor Glass Container Corp., 157 F.3d 775, 780 (10th
Cir. 1998)).
68. Id. at 1273.
69. Id.
70. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg., 388 U.S. 395, 403-04 (1967); Primerica
Life Ins. v. Brown, 304 F.3d 469, 471 (5th Cir. 2002); Jeske v. Brooks, 875 F.2d 71, 72 (4th Cir.
1989); Unionmutual Stock Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Beneficial Life Ins., 774 F.2d 524, 528-29 (1st
Cir. 1985).
71. See Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 402; Doctor's Assocs. Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 683
(1996); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23-26 (1991); Southland Corp. v.
Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 17 (1984).
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itself, and therefore both should be submitted to arbitration according to
the agreement.72
To maintain consistency in their decisions, the Court may decide to
reverse the decision in Spahr.73 This may occur because after the Su-
preme Court made its decision in Prima Paint, other courts have consis-
tently upheld the Prima Paint rationale by reversing inconsistent cases
and setting a uniform standard of review for courts on every level.74
There are compelling public policy reasons, however, for the Supreme
Court to alter its decision in Prima Paint by incorporating the Spahr
holding in deciding the arbitrability of claims that challenge contracts
containing arbitration agreements. The primary public policy reasons
include the fact that Prima Paint favors businesses over consumers,
forces consumers into agreements they have not bargained for, and de-
nies individuals their constitutional right to a jury trial. 5
Although legislative intent stresses a national policy favoring arbi-
tration, Congress has not displayed such favor towards businesses. 76 Re-
gardless, the outcome of many arbitration disputes resulted in decisions
unquestionably favoring businesses, leaving consumers in a position for
which they never bargained.77 Prima Paint and other decisions following
its rationale do this very thing by favoring businesses and their adhesive
agreements that unfairly bind consumers.7 8 The challenge of enforcing
arbitration agreements while not overstepping legislative intent is an
obstacle courts will face in years to come. Arguably this challenge could
best be overcome by adopting Spahr because Spahr reasonably and logi-
cally applies the Act without enforcing adhesive contracts that favor
businesses.
Additionally, the constitutional right to a jury trial should not be
overcome by an arbitration provision within a contract, when a party is
challenging the validity of that entire contract, as this deprives the indi-
vidual of the right to a jury trial and contravenes the legislative intent.79
With these public policy reasons in mind, the Supreme Court would be
reasonable and correct in adopting the Spahr decision as part of the stan-
dard in determining whether a claim challenging a contract containing an
arbitration agreement should be resolved in a court proceeding rather
than arbitration.
72. See Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 402; Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 683; Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23-26;
Southland, 465 U.S. at 17.
73. See Primerica Life Ins., 304 F.3d at 472.
74. Id.
75. See Dauer, supra note 8, 94-96; Weston, supra note 3, at 600-01.
76. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16.
77. See supra note 13; Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 683.
78. Arguably, enforcing arbitration agreements against consumers favors businesses. See
Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 400-06.




The Tenth Circuit's opinion in Spahr, which holds that a mental ca-
pacity claim goes to the "making" of the contract and should be heard by
a court instead of an arbitrator, appears to subject contracts with or
without arbitration provisions to the same requirements. The trend of
federal courts to enforce arbitration provisions in the manner Congress
intended81 at times gives contracts containing arbitration provisions more
obstacles than those without arbitration provisions.82 Consumers entering
into such agreements are experiencing outcomes they might not logically
expect, especially in cases where an arbitrator, rather than a judge, de-
cides if an arbitration provision within a contract is enforceable.83 The
issue raises a serious problem in consumer contracts, because if a party is
fraudulently induced into entering a contract, and the subsequent claims
are then subjected to arbitration, that party arguably never entered into
any valid agreement, let alone an agreement to arbitrate.84 This contra-
diction produces unpredictable and illogical outcomes because contracts
without an arbitration clause are held to a different standard than con-
tracts containing them.
85
Although the Tenth Circuit's opinion in Spahr departs from the
Prima Paint rationale,86 Spahr is nonetheless logical, fair, and provides a
rational method of evaluating arbitration agreements. The main distinc-
tion between Spahr and Prima Paint is how and where these two courts
draw the line in determining whether the "making" of the agreement to
arbitrate shall be resolved by a court rather than arbitration.
The Prima Paint rationale focused on whether the challenge to the
agreement goes to the "making" of the entire contract, versus the "mak-
ing" of the arbitration provision, to determine whether the dispute should
be resolved in a court rather than arbitration.87 Prima Paint held that if a
contract defense challenges the contract as a whole, it should be resolved
80. Spahr, 330 F.3d at 1272-73.
81. See Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 682-89; Southland, 465 U.S. at 5-7.
82. See Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 681-86; Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24-26; Southland, 465 U.S. at 5-6;
Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 402; Primerica Life Ins., 304 F.3d at 472; Jeske, 875 F.2d at 75; Unionmu-
tual Stock Life Ins., 774 F.2d at 529. See generally Edward A. Dauer, Contracts of Adhesion in Light
of the Bargain Hypothesis: An Introduction, 5 AKRON L. REV. 1 (1972) (analyzing the pros and cons
of arbitration provisions); Richard M. Alderman, Pre-Dispute Mandatory Arbitration in Consumer
Contracts: A Call for Reform, 38 Hous. L. REV. 1237 (2001) (discussing the shortcomings of arbi-
tration provisions).
83. Rau, supra note 34, at 303-06; see also Alderman, supra note 82, at 1242.
84. See Pittman, supra note 17, at 790-93 (discussing adhesion contracts and the their nega-
tive effect on consumer contracts in stating, "there has been, and currently is, a legitimate concern
over the use of adhesion contracts that force consumers to accept arbitration to resolve future dis-
putes, including personal injury claims as well as contractual claims, arising out of their purchases of
consumer goods.").
85. Rau, supra note 34, at 293.
86. Compare Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 402-04, with Spahr, 330 F.3d at 1270-75.
87. See Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 403-04.
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in arbitration; whereas if the contract defense challenges the arbitration
provision alone, a court should resolve the claim.
88
Spahr, on the other hand, focused on what contract defenses chal-
lenge the "making" of the agreement to arbitrate, without limiting the
defenses to those challenging the arbitration agreement itself.89 Spahr
determined contract defenses making the entire contract void should be
resolved by a court instead of through arbitration.90 Contract defenses
making the contract voidable, however, do not specifically challenge the
"making" of the arbitration agreement and should be resolved in arbitra-
tion.9' The Tenth Circuit in Spahr did not contradict the Prima Paint
rationale. Instead, Spahr chose a different method of analyzing the word
"making," as set out in Section 4 of the Act.92
Overall, it appears that when a party is using a contract defense to
invalidate a contract, the court's goal is to determine whether the "mak-
ing of the agreement for arbitration.., is not in issue" before compelling
arbitration.93 At this point the court will determine whether the contract
defense should be reserved for courts to decide, which inevitably creates
a potential conflict between Congress's intention to favor arbitration of
claims, and an individual's right to not be obligated to arbitrate an
agreement considered void pursuant to contract law. The courts then
must decide which claims they will hear and which claims must proceed
to arbitration, according to the agreement, in a realistic manner so that all
claims alleging a contract defense will not end up in court. Giving every
claim a court date would defeat the purpose of the FAA in trying to en-
force arbitration provisions in order to reduce "costliness and delays of
litigation."94
Both Prima Paint and Spahr attempt to find the appropriate place to
draw the line in allowing certain cases to be heard by a court instead of
requiring arbitration. Although Prima Paint and Spahr arrive at different
outcomes in distinguishing between cases that must go to arbitration ver-
sus a court proceeding, both approaches are useful in trying to establish a
workable rationale. Although Prima Paint and Spahr are not without
95their drawbacks in achieving logical and realistic outcomes, a common
88. Id.
89. See Spahr, 330 F.3d at 1271-73.
90. Id. at 1273.
91. See id. at 1271-73.
92. See id.
93. 9 U.S.C. § 4.
94. Hai Jiang, Do We Allow Contract Law to Administer Civil Rights Remedies?, 2003
DETROIT COLL. L. MICH. ST. U. L. REV. 251, 273.
95. See Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 395-407; Spahr, 330 F.3d at 1266-75. Arguably there are
downfalls in the Prima Paint decision because although Prima Paint offers a reasonable analysis of
when to send a case to arbitration instead of a court proceeding, subsequent outcomes achieved from
Prima Paint's rationale at times do not seem logical and may not fully withstand the analytical
scrutiny of other courts. Additionally in Spahr, there are downfalls as well because in separating out
contract defenses that make a contract void, and then allowing those cases to be heard in court could
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middle ground between the Prima Paint and Spahr opinions might allow
arbitration provisions to receive the same "footing" as other contract
provisions, yet loosen the adhesion many consumer arbitration provi-
sions currently face.
96
Other circuits have considered whether a contract defense invalidat-
ing an arbitration agreement should be resolved by arbitration rather than
a court proceeding.97 This paper now examines how these circuits resolve
the arbitration dilemma.
B. Fifth Circuit
1. Primerica Life Ins. v. Brown
98
a. Facts
Brown executed an agreement with CitiFinancial's affiliate,
Primerica Life Insurance Co., which contained "an arbitration clause
requiring arbitration of [Brown's] claims." 99 When a claim arose, Brown
alleged he lacked the mental capacity to enter into the contract and there-
fore was not bound to the arbitration agreement because the contract was
invalid. 00 The district court agreed, holding the arbitration provision
unenforceable because Brown lacked the mental capacity to contract.
10
b. Decision
In Primerica, the Fifth Circuit appellate court reversed the district
court, holding that a mental capacity challenge to the entire contract must
go to arbitration pursuant to the arbitration clause. 0 2 Relying on Prima
Paint, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that pursuant to Section 4 of the FAA,
federal courts may only consider "issues relating to the making and per-
formance of the agreement to arbitrate."' 1 3 The court explained that
Brown's mental capacity claim challenged the entire contract without
specifically challenging the arbitration clause, and thus issues relating to
arbitration agreements were never disputed. 1°4 Without any issues relat-
ing to the arbitration agreement in controversy, the court determined it
lead to the same problem that the FAA wanted to prevent; which includes reducing cases in the
courts and not allowing the courts to give arbitration provisions less "footing" than other contract
provisions.
96. See, e.g., Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 423 (Black, J., dissenting) (recognizing the "purpose of
the Act was to place arbitration agreements upon the same footing as other contracts" (internal
quotations omitted)); Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 682 (recognizing and applying same principal); Gilmer,
500 U.S. at 24 (same); Southland, 465 U.S. at 15-16 (same).
97. Spahr, 330 F.3d at 1272.
98. 304 F.3d 469 (5th Cir. 2002).
99. Primerica Life Ins., 304 F.3d at 470.
100. Id. at 471.
101. Id.
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lacked authority to hear Brown's contract defense and submitted the
claim to arbitration. 10
5
C. Fourth Circuit
1. Jeske v. Brooks
10 6
a. Facts
Jeske, an investor, sought investment advice from Brooks, an em-
ployee at an investment firm. 107 When Jeske entered into an investor rela-
tionship with Brooks, he signed an agreement that "contained an arbitra-
tion clause covering all disputes over matters relating to the agree-
ment." °8 After suffering losses stemming from Brook's investment ad-
vice, Jeske filed claims against Brooks and Brooks' investment firm.' 9
When Brooks asked the court to stay the proceedings and compel arbitra-
tion pursuant to the agreement, the district court compelled arbitration of
the state law claims, but refused to require arbitration of the federal
claims. 110
b. Decision
In Jeske, the Fourth Circuit held that claims of unconscionability
and lack of consideration challenge the entire contract's formation and as
such should be decided by arbitration. 1' Relying on Prima Paint, the
Fourth Circuit determined that when a claim challenges the validity of an
entire contract, and the arbitration provision within the contract is not
specifically challenged, the question regarding the contract's validity is
within the scope of arbitration. 12 The court ignored the potential conflict
that may exist when an entire contract is invalid as a matter of law, and
thus the embedded arbitration clause is inapplicable, yet the claim must
first go to arbitration to determine whether or not the contract is valid."
3
105. Id.
106. 875 F.2d 71 (4th Cir. 1989).
107. Jeske, 875 F.2d at 72.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 72-73.










Unionmutual and Beneficial, both insurance companies, entered
into a "Portfolio Indemnification Reinsurance Agreement" which in-
cluded an arbitration clause requiring any dispute arising from the in-
demnification agreement to be arbitrated in Portland, Maine.!15 After
forming the agreement, Beneficial contacted Unionmutual to rescind the
indemnification agreement, stating that the recent passage of the Deficit
Reduction Tax Act "frustrated the purpose of the contract."'" 6 The dis-
trict court granted Unionmutual's motion to compel arbitration of Bene-
ficial's dispute.17
b. Decision
On appeal, the First Circuit appellate court affirmed, holding that
claims of mutual mistake and frustration of purpose challenging the mak-
ing of the entire contract should be decided by an arbitrator. 18 Relying
on the severability doctrine discussed in Prima Paint, the court took the
position that arbitration clauses .'are 'separable' from the contracts in
which they are embedded, and that where no claim is made that fraud
was directed at the arbitration clause itself, a broad arbitration clause will
be held to encompass arbitration of the claim that the contract itself was
induced by fraud.""' 9 The First Circuit court reasoned that Beneficial's
attempt to invalidate the entire contract lacked an independent challenge
to the validity of the arbitration agreement. 20 Without an independent
challenge separating the arbitration agreement from the rest of the con-
tract, the court determined arbitration was the appropriate forum to de-
cide the validity of the contract.1
21
III. ANALYSIS
Several federal circuit courts of appeal reviewed cases involving
contract defenses as applied to arbitration agreements.122 Among the de-
114. 774 F.2d 524 (lst Cir. 1985).
115. Unionmutual Stock Life Ins., 774 F.2d at 525.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 529.
119. Id. at 528 (quoting Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg., 388 U.S. 395, 402
(1967)).
120. Id. at 529.
121. Id.
122. See Primerica Life Ins. v. Brown, 304 F.3d 469, 472 (5th Cir. 2002); Jeske v. Brooks, 875
F.2d 71, 75 (4th Cir. 1989); Unionmutual Stock Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Beneficial Life Ins., 774
F.2d 524, 529 (1st Cir. 1985).
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cisions discussed above, these courts all relied on the Prima Paint ration-
ale in their decisions.123 Primerica, Jeske, and Unionmutual, each held
the contact claims in these cases were subject to arbitration, pursuant to
the arbitration agreement in the contract, because the contract defenses
challenged the overall contract and not the making of the arbitration
agreement itself. 12 4 In each of these cases, the respective court applied
the Prima Paint rationale in questioning whether the claim challenged
the contract as a whole or just the arbitration agreement, to determine
that each claim was subject to arbitration because each challenged the
entire contract. 1
25
The Prima Paint doctrine these circuits apply seems easily over-
come if a party simply challenges the "making" of the arbitration agree-
ment, in which case the party will receive a court hearing. 126 Otherwise,
if the party challenges the contract as a whole, the party is subject to ar-
bitration. 27 Therefore, to receive a court hearing and not be subject to
arbitration, a party need only assert a claim challenging the arbitration
agreement itself, instead of the entire contract. 128 This seems unreason-
able and against the clear legislative intent behind the FAA.
129
In Spahr v. Secco, the Tenth Circuit court interpreted Section 4 of
the Act, holding that claims making a contract void, rather than voidable
bring the "making" of the entire agreement, including the agreement to
arbitrate, into issue and should be resolved in a court proceeding.
30
Spahr would likely reach a different outcome than the First, Fourth, and
Fifth Circuits reached in similar cases because Spahr held contract de-
fenses making the entire contract void also challenge the "making" of the
arbitration agreement and should be resolved by a court.' 3' Spahr draws
the line between contract defenses challenging the "making" of an arbi-
tration agreement, even if the defense challenges the entire contract as
well, and contract defenses that do not. 132 According to Spahr, if a claim
challenges the "making" of the arbitration agreement, a court should
123. Primerica Life Ins., 304 F.3d at 472; Jeske, 875 F.2d at 75; Unionmutual Stock Life Ins.,
774 F.2d at 529.
124. Primerica Life Ins., 304 F.3d at 472; Jeske, 875 F.2d at 75; Unionmutual Stock Life Ins.,
774 F.2d at 529.
125. Primerica Life Ins., 304 F.3d at 472; Jeske, 875 F.2d at 75; Unionmutual Stock Life Ins.,
774 F.2d at 529.
126. Primerica Life Ins., 304 F.3d at 472; Jeske, 875 F.2d at 75; Unionmutual Stock Life Ins.,
774 F.2d at 529.
127. Primerica Life Ins., 304 F.3d at 472; Jeske, 875 F.2d at 75; Unionmutual Stock Life Ins.,
774 F.2d at 529.
128. Primerica Life Ins., 304 F.3d at 472; Jeske, 875 F.2d at 75; Unionmutual Stock Life Ins.,
774 F.2d at 529.
129. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg., 388 U.S. 395. 407-12 (1967) (Black, J.,
dissenting) (citing to specific legislative history for enacting the FAA); MACNEIL, supra note 49, at
83-121.
130. Spahr v. Secco, 330 F.3d 1266, 1267-68 (10th Cir. 2003).




resolve that claim, regardless of the fact that the claim challenges the
entire contract instead of just the arbitration agreement. 133 Spahr's rea-
soning not only takes into account whether the arbitration provision or
the entire contract was being challenged, but whether the "making" of
the arbitration agreement is at issue.
34
The Tenth Circuit's decision in Spahr contributed to a split among
the circuit courts 135 regarding different applications of Section 4 of the
Act. 36 The Tenth Circuit explicitly disagreed with the Fifth Circuit in
Primerica Life Ins. v. Brown,137 holding that where a party claims a lack
of mental capacity to enter into a contract, a court rather than an arbitra-
tor should decide the claim. 
38
As Spahr reasoned, a person should not be subject to arbitration
when he or she has not so agreed. 39 Therefore, when the "making" of a
contract containing an arbitration agreement is at issue, it seems implicit
that the person never agreed to arbitrate. The Spahr rationale takes into
account the "tenet of federal arbitration law" in holding that regardless of
whether the challenge goes to the "making" of the entire contract or the
"making" of the arbitration agreement, a party should not be forced to
submit a dispute to arbitration unless there was consent. 40 Spahr is dif-
ferent from Prima Paint because the latter distinguishes between whether
the claim challenges the entire contract or the arbitration provision within
the contract, and then resolves the claims that challenge the entire con-
tract through arbitration. 14 Although the Spahr and Prima Paint ration-
ales are not contradictory because they both apply similar interpretations
of Section 4, their rationales do produce dissimilar results because of the
different interpretations of the word "making."' 142 As such, the Tenth
Circuit's reasoning in Spahr is arguably the better approach in determin-
ing what cases should be heard by a court because the Spahr analysis
truly questions whether the claim goes to the "making" of the agreement
to arbitrate, rather than looking at whether the claim challenges the entire
contract or the arbitration agreement alone. 43 Spahr's approach main-
tains a logical, fair, and rational method of evaluating arbitration agree-






137. 304 F.3d at 472 (holding a mental capacity defense that goes to the making of the entire
contract must be arbitrated).
138. Spahr, 330 F.3d at 1272.
139. Id. at 1268.
140. Id. at 1269-75.
141. See id.; Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 402-07.
142. Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 402-07; Spahr, 330 F.3d at 1269-70.
143. Spahr, 330 F.3d at 1271-73.
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Should the U.S. Supreme Court hear Spahr, its decision will affect
not only the future of arbitration agreement enforceability, but also the
fundamental procedural fairness for those entering into contracts contain-
ing them. Although Spahr reaches a different outcome from other circuit
courts in cases with similar facts,144 the Court will have the opportunity
to create a fairer standard in arbitration agreement enforceability that is
based on public policy concerns. The primary policy reasons for adopt-
ing Spahr's rationale is the promotion of fairness in the legal system by
giving consumers the same treatment and protection businesses receive
under the law, enforcing contracts consumers have freely bargained for,
and affording individuals their constitutional right to a jury trial. 145 These
are all important public policy reasons because the legal system is based
in large measure on principles of equity, and currently the Court's stance
on arbitration agreements strongly favors businesses, and unfairly binds
consumers. 146 By adopting the Tenth Circuit's decision in Spahr, the
Court better promote the goals of the Federal Arbitration Act.
CONCLUSION
With Congress passing the FAA in 1925 and the United States Su-
preme Court holding arbitration as a comparable means to litigation,
deserving of the same "footing" as other contract provisions,147 it is ap-
parent the use of arbitration agreements will continue to grow consumer
contracts. Arbitration is likely to play an important role in many future
contract cases in the Tenth and other circuits, which is why it is so im-
portant to understand the opinion in Spahr.
When the Tenth Circuit in Spahr stated that a court should hear a
case involving a mental capacity claim that challenges the validity of the
entire contract, it effectively established a new method of analyzing
contract defenses that attack the validity of arbitration clauses. Spahr
thus established a useful alternative to the Prima Paint rationale in de-
termining whether a court shall hear a case or compel arbitration. 149 The
rationale in Spahr may initially create confusion when compared to
Prima Paint because Spahr seemingly reaches the opposite outcome
from Prima Paint in cases with similar facts. 150 Spahr, however, does
give an applicable interpretation of the word "making,"1 5 1 as set forth in
the Section 4 of the Act. This interpretation will likely aid courts in de-
144. See supra note 13.
145. See Dauer, supra note 8, 94-96; Weston, supra note 3, at 600-01.
146. See Dauer, supra note 8, 94-96; Weston, supra note 3, at 600-01.
147. See Doctor's Assocs. Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996); Southland Corp. v.
Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 7-18 (1984).
148. See Spahr v. Secco, 330 F.3d 1266, 1272 (10th Cir. 2003).
149. Spahr, 330 F.3d at 1272-75.
150. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg., 388 U.S. 395, 402 (1967); Spahr, 330
F.3d at 1272.
151. See Spahr, 330 F.3d at 1272.
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ciding cases while sustaining the intended purpose of the FAA. Impor-
tantly, the Spahr holding is critical in achieving outcomes that truly place




152. See Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 681-86.
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